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1. Introduction
In November 2017, the world marked the  one hundred-year anniversary of Russia’s 
October Revolution and looked back at one 
of the greatest experiments in economic 
and political history—the journey of Russia 
through communist revolution, abolition 
of private property, and construction of a 
 command economy with almost full state 
ownership and almost complete price regu-
lation and elimination of markets. Some epi-
sodes of this journey—however tragic,  cost 
ineffective, and brutal—have awed outside 
observers. Jospeh Stalin’s  top-down indus-
trialization has, in fact, inspired academic 
economists and policy makers around the 
world. Even though Stalin started World 
War II as an ally of Adolph Hitler, the cru-
cial contribution to the  anti-Nazi coalition’s 
victory legitimized the Soviet Union’s status 
as one of the two superpowers in the  postwar 
era. This is why the final years of the Soviet 
Union and its rapid disintegration represent 
a seeming puzzle. Why did an apparently 
Gorbachev versus Deng: A Review of 
Chris Miller’s The Struggle to Save the 
Soviet Economy†
Sergei Guriev*
Chris Miller’s book is a historian’s account of Mikhail Gorbachev’s efforts to save the 
Soviet economy. Miller focuses on the question of why Gorbachev did not follow Deng 
Xiaoping and did not manage to reform the economy. Miller argues that it was not 
for the lack of understanding (Gorbachev did invest in learning China’s approach 
to reform and did understand it well), nor for the lack of trying. In fact, Gorbachev 
did try to implement Deng’s agricultural and industrial enterprise reforms. However, 
Gorbachev’s reforms were blocked by powerful vested interests. An inability to tackle 
the agricultural and industrial lobbies eventually resulted in the bankruptcy and col-
lapse of the Soviet Union. While I generally agree with the political economy argument, 
I discuss a number of alternative explanations. I also discuss sources of Gorbachev’s 
weak state capacity and offer an evaluation of Gorbachev’s and post-Gorbachev 
reform efforts and mistakes based on the political economy research carried out in the 
last twenty-five years. ( JEL D72, O57, P21, P23, P24, P26)
* The European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment, Sciences Po, and CEPR. I am grateful to  Steven 
Durlauf, Maxim Boycko, Timothy Frye, and  Ekaterina 
Zhuravskaya for excellent comments on the early drafts of 
this essay.
† Go to https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20171470 to visit the 
article page and view author disclosure statement(s).
121Guriev: A Review of The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy
powerful economy and polity fall apart so 
quickly? With all its rigidities and inefficien-
cies, why would its leaders be unable to fix 
whatever shortcomings it had and save the 
Soviet Union? 
This question is not an abstract one. The 
late Soviet Union’s failure to reform had an 
obvious counterfactual—Deng Xiaoping’s 
success. Initially, communist China followed 
Stalin’s industrialization model—both in 
economic and political terms.1 However, 
after Mao Zedong’s death and leadership 
turnover, Deng pushed for more pragmatic 
policies, gradually introduced adequate 
incentives (first in agriculture and then in 
industry)—and put China on a trajectory 
of fast and sustainable growth. Given that 
Deng’s reforms started a few years before 
the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev 
came to power, why wouldn’t the Soviet 
Union follow Deng’s path? Was Soviet lead-
ership incompetent? Unaware of Chinese 
success? Did they not realize that reforms 
were needed and needed urgently?
These are the questions at the center of 
Chris Miller’s book, The Struggle to Save the 
Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and 
the Collapse of the USSR. While the author 
is a historian, the book is, first and fore-
most, a case study in political economy. And 
the answer Miller gives to all the questions 
above is very simple: “It’s all political econ-
omy, stupid.” Gorbachev understood what 
Deng was doing. He also understood that the 
Soviet system was not working. But he failed 
to reform it because he was not able to over-
come powerful  antireform interest groups. 
This argument gets at the core of the 
conventional story that usually blames 
Gorbachev for the wrong sequencing 
of political and economic reform. Deng 
started with the economic reform keeping 
the Communist Party in control of politics. 
1 See a comparison of Stalin’s and Mao’s industrializa-
tions in Cheremukhin et al. (2017a, b).
Gorbachev started with the political reform. 
Miller’s argument is that Gorbachev had no 
choice. Without political reform he could not 
have overcome lobbies’ resistance to eco-
nomic reforms. If anything, in order to suc-
ceed, he should have reformed the political 
system faster and more decisively. This could 
have opened up opportunities for real, rather 
than  half-hearted, economic reform as well.
1.1 The Context
The book opens with Gorbachev’s visit 
to China in May of 1989. The  four-day trip 
was the first Soviet leader’s visit to China 
since 1959; it was planned well in advance 
and was supposed to demonstrate the long 
overdue mending of Sino–Soviet relations. 
Symbolically, the Tiananmen protests had 
started right before Gorbachev’s arrival. Two 
hundred thousand protesters blocked the 
square, so the anticipated red carpet recep-
tion in Tiananmen was canceled. Moreover, 
even after the ceremony was relocated to 
the airport, there was no red carpet there 
as well—someone simply forgot to arrange 
it. Even more symbolically, only two weeks 
after the visit, the Chinese government 
decided to send the troops to Tiananmen 
square. As Miller shows, this decision has 
been very important for understanding the 
fate of economic and political reforms in the 
Soviet Union and China.
Where were these two countries in terms 
of level of development in 1989? In figures 1 
and 2, I present Maddison’s data on China 
and the Soviet Union’s per capita GDP and 
its level with respect to the US level. The 
latter is especially important, as catching up 
with the West was central to policy makers 
in both the Soviet Union and China. I rely 
on Maddison’s data as these are the ones that 
Miller’s figures and tables are based on. It 
is hard to disagree with Miller, who argues 
(p. xvii) that Soviet data were not informa-
tive (being “widely fudged”). Another prob-
lem was, of course, that the regulated prices 
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 distorted the link between GDP per  capita 
and standards of living. In particular, all 
investments were carried out by the govern-
ment, and therefore accounted for at cost in 
GDP statistics; in a command economy, the 
cost of capital goods could be very far from 
their market value. 
Yet, with all these caveats, Maddison’s data 
on GDP per capita provide a useful context 
for understanding the evolution of Soviet 
and Chinese income levels. In 1989, the 
Soviet Union was a middle income country 
with GDP per capita at 7,000 dollars (1990 
 Geary–Khamis international dollars).2 Soviet 
GDP per capita had been stagnating since 
the 1970s: in 1974–89, its average growth 
2 As Maddison data are only available through 2010, for 
later years I use extrapolations based on the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook. 
rate was below 1 percent per year. In terms 
of level of development, China was far 
behind the Soviet Union—by the factor of 
four!—but was rapidly catching up. In the 
early 1980s, China’s GDP per capita was 
already growing at 6 percent.  
Figures 1 and 2 reveal several features 
that have dramatic implications for the book. 
First, the last years of the Soviet Union were 
not just years of stagnation in terms of GDP 
per capita, but also—naturally—those of lag-
ging behind the United States. Soviet GDP 
per capita declined from 38 percent of the 
US level in the mid 1970s to 31 percent in 
1989—the level first reached in the 1930s 
and not much above tsarist Russia’s peak of 
29 percent. 
Second, in 1989 China’s GDP per capita 
was at 8 percent of the US level—similar to 
the 10 percent that the Soviet economy had 
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Figure 1. GDP per Capita, Constant International 1990 Dollars
Note: GDP per capita in Former Soviet Union, Russia, and China, constant 1990 Geary–Khamis international 
dollars.
Sources: Maddison Project (until 2010), World Economic Outlook April 2017 (2011–16, based on growth 
rates for GDP per capita in international dollars).
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in 1921 when it embarked on rapid recovery 
after the Civil War due to the New Economic 
Policy (NEP). This analogy is especially 
important as Deng’s  dual-track policies were 
in fact quite similar to the NEP, in terms 
of introducing market incentives on the 
 margin and allowing for private  ownership 
of  small-scale firms (in agriculture, services 
and manufacturing) while keeping large 
enterprises under state control. NEP was 
also attractive to Gorbachev as it was con-
sidered to be Vladimir Lenin’s legacy, later 
replaced by Stalin’s brutal collectivization. 
Gorbachev’s political narrative was critical of 
Stalin but quite positive toward Lenin. 
Third, China today is at the same level of 
development relative to the United States 
where the Soviet economy was in the late 
1980s. Fourth, in the coming years, the con-
sensus forecasts predict much higher rates 
of GDP growth in China than in Russia, so 
Russia will be increasingly lagging behind 
China.  
The first fact explains Gorbachev’s will-
ingness to look for ways to reform the econ-
omy. The second one suggests that Deng’s 
China once again showed that the NEP was 
a robust solution to the conundrum of boost-
ing growth without losing political control.3 
This provided a certain degree of confidence 
that Deng’s success can be replicated in 
Russia. The third observation implies that 
studying Gorbachev’s experience may be 
relevant for understanding modern China’s 
3 In what follows, I am using “NEP” as a reference 
to the 1920s Soviet economic reforms only and discuss 
Gorbachev’s political reforms separately. The freedom of 
expression in 1920s and in Gorbachev years was certainly 
higher than in Deng’s China. However, in all these cases, 
the reformers’ intention was never to challenge the ulti-
mate control of political power held by the Communist 
Party.
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Figure 2. GDP per Capita, Percent US Level
Note: GDP per capita in Former Soviet Union, Russia, and China relative to the US level.
Sources: Maddison Project (until 2010), World Economic Outlook April 2017 (2011–16, based on growth 
rates for GDP per capita in international dollars).
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challenges. And if China is successful, then a 
few years later—if and when Russia decides 
to reform—it will once again be Russia’s 
turn to learn from China. Indeed, the fourth 
observation implies that China has already 
covered the ground where Russia is going to 
be when Russia decides to reform.
1.2 The Structure of the Book
The book consists of seven chapters. 
The first three chapters set the stage for 
Gorbachev’s reforms. In the first chap-
ter, Miller explains the views of the Soviet 
elite regarding the performance of socialist 
economies. The Soviet government had at 
least two reasons to worry. First, as shown 
above, there was a long stagnation in the 
Soviet economy that was increasingly lag-
ging behind the West. In 1961, Soviet leader 
Nikita Khrushchev famously promised that 
the Soviet Union would complete the basic 
foundations of communism4 by 1980; he also 
promised to catch up with  and overtake the 
United States. This, of course, did not hap-
pen. By 1980, Soviet GDP per capita was 
57 percent higher than in 1961, but still only 
35 percent of the US level, pretty much the 
same ratio as in 1961 (36 percent).5 
4 At that point, “communism” was understood as a soci-
ety where everyone would contribute to GDP according 
to his/her ability and would be rewarded according to 
his/her needs. Certainly this definition was quite vague (as 
it depended on what the “needs” were supposed to be). 
However, the very basic consumption needs were still not 
satisfied in Soviet times: e.g., in 1990 there were 16 square 
meters of housing per person—half the level in Western 
Europe and about a quarter of the US level (Hardt and 
Kaufman 1993, p. 875).
5 As an economic historian, Miller does not discuss 
another key reason for concern—the comprehensive 
disillusionment in the system. Hollander (1999) shows 
that disillusionment in communist values spread widely 
throughout the society, from ordinary citizens to the elite 
(with an important exception of the KGB). Hollander 
argues that disillusionment also had a strong negative 
effect on political legitimacy and economic productivity. 
Although he recognizes potential reverse causality (from 
Second, Miller carefully describes the 
Soviet views on Eastern Europe, where the 
Soviet government allowed for limited exper-
imentation with market mechanisms. By 
early 1980s, these experiments were consid-
ered to be a failure. While Eastern European 
countries continued to enjoy higher living 
standards than the Soviet Union, their GDP 
growth turned into the negative territory 
(p. 17). The Eastern European governments 
tried to borrow, which resulted in skyrock-
eting debt (p. 14). In order to repay the 
debt, these governments had to undertake 
austerity programs cutting Western imports, 
consumption, and investment. The most 
extreme case was Romania, where Nicolae 
Ceausescu decided to repay the debt in full, 
plunging his country into outright poverty. 
In Poland, the decline in living standards 
resulted in nationwide support for the oppo-
sition Solidarity movement (p. 15). 
Miller also discusses Soviet experts’ views 
of the West. These were the years of the 
consensus that the United States was ced-
ing economic leadership to Japan. The other 
East Asian countries were also enjoying 
fast growth. This resulted in Gorbachev’s 
“Asia pivot”—increasing interest in Asia by 
Gorbachev’s government. Miller describes 
the investment in capacity building for 
understanding the East Asian growth 
model—with research institutes and min-
istries creating Pacific divisions (p. 27). 
When preparing for his July 1986 speech in 
Vladivostok, Gorbachev told his speechwrit-
ers that the Soviet Union should redouble 
its efforts there as “the civilization is moving 
toward the Pacific Ocean” (p. 28).
In the second chapter, Miller describes 
Soviet views on  post-Mao China. He shows 
that Soviet elites had a reasonably accurate 
and detailed understanding of what was hap-
pening there and quite  correctly  predicted 
stagnation to disillusionment), he believes that disillusion-
ment was driven to a great extent by  noneconomic factors. 
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future developments. The Soviet scholars 
of socialist economies argued that there are 
important similarities in reform challenges 
between China and the Soviet Union, and 
therefore Chinese reforms should be con-
sidered a key reform lab for the Soviet 
ones (p. 51). This was especially true for 
Gorbachev’s close advisors. Even though 
the think tanks’ and advisors’ reports on 
China were not published, they were dis-
tributed internally throughout the upper 
echelons of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (p. 39). Moreover, it was clear 
that Gorbachev did read these materials 
(p. 53).
A key milestone was Gorbachev’s speech 
in Krasnoyarsk in 1988. Gorbachev argued 
that both the Soviet Union and China were 
undergoing important reforms and that cre-
ated a ground for “mutual attraction.” It was 
important that Soviet interest in China’s 
reforms was not limited to the elites—even 
pedestrians in the streets of Moscow were 
aware of China’s “innovative economic 
 policies” (p. 52).
The third chapter is key to the book’s argu-
ment. Miller describes the political economy 
of Gorbachev’s Soviet Union. He documents 
the composition and the incentives of the 
three main interest groups: the defense 
industry, agriculture, and energy compa-
nies. He argues that each of these groups 
was very powerful: given the lack of open-
ness and competition, each of these groups 
was actually a combination of monopolies, 
their suppliers and customers who greatly 
depended on their success, and their rep-
resentatives in the top political cadres. Not 
surprisingly, Soviet newspeak referred to 
these as “complexes”:  the defense-indus-
trial complex (OPK),  agro-industrial com-
plex (APK), and  fuel-energy complex (TEK) 
(p. 57). The defense complex was the larg-
est one, accounting for about 20 percent of 
Soviet industrial output and 75 percent of 
research and development, employing about 
15  million people (about 10 percent of the 
labor force) and consuming 60 percent of 
the steel (p. 59). 
In the second half of the book, Miller dis-
cusses Gorbachev’s attempts to take on these 
groups. Chapter 4 describes Gorbachev’s 
enterprise reforms; chapter 5, his attempts 
to follow the Chinese model of special eco-
nomic zones; and chapter 6, his attempts 
to reform agriculture. Interestingly, these 
reforms were targeting the very same sectors 
as the first three reforms of Deng. In all three 
cases, Gorbachev hoped that the reforms 
would increase productivity, thus providing 
more fiscal space and supporting stagnating 
living standards (p. 71–72). All three efforts 
were, however,  half-hearted and generally 
failed, especially the ones in agriculture. 
The latter failure was even more spectacular 
given that Gorbachev had personal reasons 
to promote agricultural reforms: his own 
family experienced Stalin’s collectivization 
(p. 120). However, Gorbachev eventually 
did not succeed, being opposed by—and 
fearing—the agricultural lobby.6
The final, seventh chapter describes the 
USSR’s fiscal crisis and collapse. As oil prices 
fell, Gorbachev tried to maintain living stan-
dards that resulted in major growth in the 
budget deficit. Before Gorbachev came to 
power, the budget was balanced or even had 
a small surplus. In 1985, the deficit grew 
to 2 percent of GDP, by 1990, it reached 
10 percent of GDP. In 1991, the last year 
of the Soviet Union, the deficit exceeded an 
astronomical 30 percent of GDP (p. 152).7 
6 Russian agriculture kept stagnating until the early 
2000s, when the land market was finally created and Russia 
became one of the largest grain exporters—after decades 
of importing grain.
7 Miller provides a reference to a World Bank report, 
but warns that these numbers are contested. In addition 
to the rapid political and organizational change in 1991, 
the budget data suffered from the notorious Soviet secrecy. 
When Gorbachev asked  then-Secretary General Andropov 
in 1982 for budget data, the response was: “Not happening! 
You’re asking too much. The budget is off limits to you.” 
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The fiscal crisis was partly explained by a 
collapse in global oil prices, but was partly 
handmade. First, Gorbachev’s  antialcohol 
campaign reduced revenues from excise taxes. 
Second, in order to keep the industrial and 
agricultural lobbies happy, the government 
continued to subsidize their inputs and raise 
prices for their outputs. At the same time, in 
order to pacify the general public, consumer 
prices were kept low. Gorbachev also avoided 
cutting expenditures on public goods and 
tried to maintain living standards. He decided 
that—unlike Deng—he would not use force 
to suppress protesters, and therefore tried to 
avoid the situation where people took to the 
street to voice their economic grievances.8
To fund the deficit, the government 
resorted to borrowing. The foreign debt 
increased from 30 percent of GDP in 1985 to 
80 percent of GDP in 1991 (p. 152). As the 
markets were growing increasingly reluctant 
to lend, the government funded the deficit 
by printing money. The official prices were 
still controlled, so the monetization of the 
budget deficit resulted in “repressed infla-
tion,” increased shortages, and higher prices 
in black markets. Eventually, the Soviet 
Union ran out of cash and collapsed.9
(Miller, p. xvii). Also, in the middle of 1991, Soviet govern-
ment implemented a threefold increase in regulated prices 
creating additional challenges for budget statistics.
8 Miller argues (p. 149) that Tiananmen protests were 
driven not only by political demands, but also by growing 
economic tension. The cost of living in large Chinese cities 
increased by 20 percent in 1988 alone. The Chinese gov-
ernment’s ability to suppress mass protests provided it with 
a stronger hand in bargaining versus the elites and the pub-
lic compared to Gorbachev. After the Tiananmen crack-
down, the Chinese government undertook a  three-year 
program of austerity, reducing both investment and con-
sumption. Without the option to repress the protests, the 
Soviet government apparently felt constrained by inability 
to lower living standards; nor it could be too slow on the 
political change—also demanded by protesters in Moscow.
9 The  non-sustainability of the Soviet 30 percent of 
GDP budget deficit is especially obvious if one compares 
it to modern Venezuela’s (14–18 percent of GDP in recent 
years) and Greece’s (15 percent of GDP in 2009, the worst 
year of its recent crisis). 
Miller’s account shows that both oil price 
shockas and the impact of the  antialcohol 
campaign were not the major drivers of the 
fiscal crisis. The main factors were lack of 
resolve in tackling the interest groups and 
in maintaining fiscal discipline, as well as 
incompetence in basic economics.  
1.3 The Methodology
For an academic economics audience, it 
is useful to explain what Miller actually does 
in the book. In recent years, economic his-
tory has become much more quantitative 
(Abramitzky 2015, Margo 2017); economic 
history papers increasingly turn to advanced 
econometric methods used in the other fields 
of economics and are published in general 
interest economics journals. Miller’s book is 
different. It does not include any regressions. 
There are only eleven graphs and one table 
in the book. In this sense, it is a traditional 
history book with a verbal analysis of a his-
torical episode based on archival documents.
As such, the book is very valuable as the 
first attempt to analyze Gorbachev’s reforms 
carried out by an academic historian. There 
have been a number of memoirs on the period 
written up by reformers and their opponents 
(with the most important contribution by the 
top  post-Gorbachev reformer, Yegor Gaidar 
himself (Gaidar 2007)). The contribution of 
Miller’s book is that it is not a memoir, but a 
solid piece of academic research written by 
an independent scholar with no stake in the 
debate. While the author also draws on his 
interviews of surviving participants of these 
events (policy makers and their advisors), his 
main conclusions are based on archival docu-
ments, rather than on the key players’ recol-
lections provided today. Given the degree of 
polarization in evaluating Gorbachev’s perfor-
mance, it is quite plausible that recollections 
are not only imprecise, but also suffering from 
a  self-serving bias (Schacter 2001). 
Yet, the interviews are also critical for the 
book, as they explain the logic behind the 
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reports written by think tanks and individual 
advisors and help in interpreting the reports’ 
impact. Moreover, by conducting the inter-
views, Miller has provided an important 
public good for future researchers, since he 
asked Gorbachev’s advisors questions that 
are not covered explicitly in their memoirs.10 
An economist can criticize the book, as it 
dwells too much on Soviet experts’ thinking 
about the United States, Japan, and China 
rather than on economic history per se. In 
this sense, it is as much or even more of a 
book on the history of economic thought, 
rather than a book on economic history. 
But I would argue that the author is right to 
focus on these issues. As he studies political 
economy, he must first and foremost analyze 
what people thought—as politics is eventu-
ally driven by perceptions (whether those do 
or do not reflect the facts). Furthermore, the 
analysis of perceptions is especially import-
ant in a society without reliable statistics and 
with limited freedom of public debate.
Economists are always suspicious of 
 nonquantitative research, as it is usually not 
clear whether the results of the analysis are 
subject to a falsification test. Suppose that the 
author has a sympathy for Gorbachev and his 
advisors (which he does seem to have). How 
do we know that he—consciously or subcon-
sciously—has been unbiased in his choice 
of interviewees and archival documents to 
study? Would the results change if the same 
analysis were conducted by a scholar with 
different political or personal preferences? 
Unfortunately, the book pays very limited 
attention to the other views prevailing at 
that point. In addition to the arguments of 
Gorbachev and his conservative opponents 
from the  antireform lobbies, Miller does not 
discuss the views of subnational leaders and 
10  The opportunities to ask such questions are unfortu-
nately perishing every day. While I was writing this essay, 
Anatoly Chernyaev, a key advisor to Gorbachev and one of 
Miller’s most important interviewees, passed away. 
only briefly covers the views of the reformers 
not connected to Gorbachev (p. 19). Miller 
only says that all of them were committed to 
more rapid liberalization (which Gorbachev 
did not support), but did not agree on a view 
of who will pay the costs of transition. 
A convincing way to address the concerns 
related to potential biases is to consider 
alternative explanations and see whether 
they would be more convincing given the 
evidence presented by the author and the 
evidence that is available otherwise. I do this 
in section 2.2 and conclude that Miller’s main 
argument is still valid, although the alterna-
tive explanations are also important. 
1.4 Why Do We Care?
As with every piece of historical research, 
we need to start with understanding why it 
matters. For historians, this is of course a 
moot point. The Soviet Union was a unique 
experiment and understanding how and why 
it disintegrated is a fascinating subject per 
se. Historians’ job is precisely to document 
such episodes in as great detail as possible. 
Here, Miller’s position strikes an important 
balance between being sufficiently close to 
the events to be able to interview the partic-
ipants and sufficiently distant that he would 
have no personal connection to the events 
and could take an objective view. 
However, Miller’s analysis is also relevant 
for readers interested in today’s affairs. First 
and foremost, economists now know that his-
tory has long shadows (Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou 2017); today’s political and eco-
nomic institutions as well as preferences and 
beliefs may be shaped by events that took 
place hundreds of years ago. It is clear that 
the process of disintegration of the Soviet 
Union has left important traces on today’s 
Russian economics and politics—which in 
turn are increasingly important not only for 
Russia’s neighbors but for the world in gen-
eral as Russia has  reemerged as a major geo-
political player. 
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The book is published in the “New Cold 
War History” series. The publishers appar-
ently had in mind the new interpretations of 
the history of the Cold War (“New History of 
the Cold War”). Ironically, as the book was 
being written the world walked into a “new 
cold war” so this book will also contribute to 
the “History of the New Cold War.” These 
two angles are not independent: many events 
unfolding today have roots in the failures of 
1980s and 1990s when—as many Russians 
seem to believe today—Soviet and Russian 
leaders (as well as their Western counter-
parts) could have done a better job. These 
failures were especially salient against the 
backdrop of China’s reforms and its stellar 
economic performance.
Second, understanding Soviet problems of 
the late 1980s can be relevant for address-
ing modern China’s challenges. Miller argues 
(and I agree with him) that Deng’s job was 
easier than Gorbachev’s because China was 
uniformly poor and therefore its political 
economy was less complex.11 Nowadays, 
however, China’s per capita income is at the 
same level of development relative to the 
United States as the Soviet Union was in the 
1980s (figure 2). Despite privatization and 
impressive market reform in the last forty 
years, the Chinese economy is dominated 
by large state-owned enterprises and state 
banks. They naturally form powerful inter-
est groups against reforms. The officials talk 
about the growing imbalances and the need 
for painful “supply-side structural reforms,” 
but no specific steps have been announced 
yet. At the same time, the top leadership 
seems to understand that it cannot afford 
reducing household income levels and there-
fore avoids deflating financial bubbles, rely-
ing instead on piling up debt. Whether or 
not another  Tiananmen-style crackdown is a 
credible threat is not clear; however, judging 
11  This argument is certainly not new (e.g., see Sachs 
and Woo 1994).
by increasing control over information and 
civil society, the government is conscious 
of the risk of protests and wants to prevent 
them in the first place.12 The Chinese econ-
omy is certainly much more flexible and 
competitive than the late Soviet one. Yet, the 
political economy parallels are striking. 
Third, similar reforms are still to be 
undertaken in many other countries with 
dominance of the public sector both with a 
communist past (such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
or Uzbekistan) and without (e.g., Algeria or 
Egypt). 
Finally, there are also increasingly com-
mon comparisons of the USSR to the 
European Union. They of course come from 
voices far from academic mainstream. But 
even if these comparisons are not fair, it is 
clear that the European Union does need to 
reform, does have powerful  antireform inter-
ests, and therefore can indeed learn from 
Gorbachev’s years. 
The book is an important illustration of 
the so called “Herbert Stein’s law”: if some-
thing cannot go on forever, it will stop. While 
this law was coined to describe the balance 
of payment crises in Latin America, the 
Soviet Union is probably the most remark-
able piece of evidence to support this law. 
Until the very end of the Soviet Union, it was 
impossible to imagine that it could fall apart; 
but then it just did.13 Since the Soviet Union 
could neither continue without reform nor 
could it reform, it simply had to stop.
12 King, Pan, and Roberts (2013) show that Chinese 
internet censorship first and foremost targets calls for col-
lective action rather than criticism of the government per 
se. Also, Cantoni et al. (2017) show that Chinese govern-
ment has made major (successful) efforts to redesign the 
school curricula to shift students’ beliefs in the nationalist 
direction—away from liberal and  pro-Western views.
13  The title of Yurchak’s (2005) history of the late Soviet 
Union says it all: Everything Was Forever until it Was No 
More.
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2. The Main Argument of the Book
2.1 Why Did Gorbachev Not Follow Deng? 
Why did the Soviet Union not reform? 
Miller’s preferred answer to this question 
is political economy. Chapter 3 opens with 
Gorbachev’s quote: “It is the politics that fol-
lows economics, and not vice versa.” While 
the idea that the “social being determines 
consciousness” has been one of the basic 
tenets of  Marxism–Leninism (and thus was 
learned by heart by every Soviet student), this 
statement was especially misleading in the 
late 1980s. The main barriers to Gorbachev’s 
economic reforms were, of course, political.14 
The Soviet economy was dominated by pow-
erful interest groups related to the defense 
industry, energy companies, and agricul-
ture. These lobbies were interested in pre-
serving the status quo. Even an omnipotent 
General Secretary of the Communist Party 
could not have crushed them. Miller (p. 59) 
cites a conversation between Gorbachev and 
Gosplan’s head Nikolai Baibakov showing 
their understanding that cutting the military 
budget would result in their “dismissal.”
How do we know that Gorbachev did not 
overestimate the power of the incumbents? 
In most historical narratives, such a question 
is difficult to address. After all, the threat of 
coup d’etat is normally an  out-of-equilibrium 
threat. However, in the case of the Soviet 
Union, it is a much more straightforward 
issue. At the end of the day, Gorbachev was 
indeed removed by a coup in August 1991. 
And if not for the unprecedented courage 
14  One of the leading advisors to Polish and Russian 
reformers Jeffrey Sachs (1993, p. 3) insisted: “The hard-
est part of the transformation, in fact, will not be the eco-
nomics at all, but the politics.” The political reform in East 
European countries was certainly less challenging than in 
the Soviet Union due to the  post-imperial nation building 
drive and the EU accession anchor. An additional factor 
was a much stronger dissident movement and civil soci-
ety that helped build stronger democratic institutions after 
transition (Bruszt et al. 2012).
of Yeltsin and his supporters, the coup (led 
by the very three vested interests listed by 
Miller) could have prevailed. Moreover, half 
a year before the coup, Gorbachev’s close ally 
Shevardnadze (then Soviet Union’s foreign 
minister) resigned with a public warning that 
a coup was coming. Just two months before 
the coup, the CIA’s presidential intelligence 
estimate listed a (successful!) coup by hard-
liners as one of four plausible scenarios for 
the USSR (Plokhy 2014). Daniels (2007, 
p. 416) also says that American Sovietologists 
expected the coup and were only surprised 
by its “ignominious failure.”
Even if Gorbachev did not expect a coup 
and did not believe such warnings, he could 
not have neglected the fate of another Soviet 
reformer, Nikita Khrushchev. Ironically, in 
addition to denouncing Stalin’s political leg-
acy, Khrushchev also attempted to implement 
 NEP-like—and hence  Deng-like—reforms. 
As described in Markevich and Zhuravskaya 
(2011), Khrushchev tried to introduce  M-form 
hierarchy in a  U-form state, creating yardstick 
competition between the regions. Essentially, 
this would introduce a Soviet version of “fed-
eralism, China style” that has been one of the 
key pillars of  post-Mao’s success (Qian 2003; 
Jin, Qian, and Weingast 2005).  This reform 
would shift economic power toward regional 
authorities and therefore greatly weaken the 
central party’s apparatus. The reform was 
not designed well; the initial conditions were 
also very different from those in China. The 
reform was rejected by the incumbents; in 
1964, Khrushchev was ousted. 
The sheer power of the  antireform interest 
groups is certainly only a part of the answer. 
If the reforms were to improve joint welfare, 
there should have been a way to negotiate a 
 win–win deal with the interest groups. The 
design of such  win–win reforms was pre-
cisely the essence of the  so-called “ dual-track 
liberalization” introduced by Deng. The 
 dual-track system was first implemented in 
agriculture (as the “household responsibility 
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system”) and then in industry (as the “con-
tract responsibility system”). The gist was to 
keep the old plan targets in place, but pro-
vide market incentives on the margin. The 
producers had to supply the planned pro-
duction quotas at regulated prices; but what-
ever they produced above the quota, they 
could sell in the market at free prices. Such 
a  dual-track system preserved the interests 
of incumbents (who received the planned 
amounts of their inputs at regulated prices), 
but also improved marginal incentives and 
therefore productivity.
Miller shows that Gorbachev and his advi-
sors were keenly aware of the  dual track’s 
success in China. Why couldn’t it be repro-
duced in the Soviet Union? Miller’s argu-
ment is that it was not for the lack of trying. 
The book’s chapter 5 shows how the creation 
of special economic zones was an attempt to 
build a second track on top of the existing 
system. More importantly, chapters 4 and 6 
show that Gorbachev did try to introduce the 
hybrid regime in industry and agriculture. 
However, the dual system only works if the 
government has the capacity to enforce its 
rules. Unless there is common knowledge 
that the rules will be enforced, the enter-
prises are no longer confident that their 
suppliers will respect the quotas and deliver 
the planned quantities at regulated prices 
(which are below market prices). Therefore, 
the enterprise managers will expect the need 
to purchase their inputs at market prices and 
will themselves know that they must sell all 
their output at market prices as well—simply 
in order to be able to pay for the inputs. Thus 
the system collapses. This was predicted in 
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) and 
described post mortem in Blanchard and 
Kremer (1997).
Gorbachev’s problem was that he had to 
reform the economy when the state capacity 
to commit and enforce was weak. This was 
not a coincidence. The very realization of the 
need to reform was driven by the widespread 
disillusionment in the Soviet system—which 
in turn undermined the legitimacy of the 
party and its ability to enforce the rules of 
the game and to deliver on its commitments. 
In democratic countries, the state capacity 
is driven by the strength of the democratic 
institutions. The social contract supporting 
reforms can be enforced even if the incum-
bent party is gone. If the reforms impose 
 short-run costs, the losers may still accept 
the deal, as they know that they will enjoy 
the benefits later. The democratic checks 
and balances assure that these benefits 
will be delivered and not expropriated by 
the future rulers. In most  nondemocratic 
regimes, it is impossible to commit to redis-
tributing the benefits of the reforms;15 those 
unhappy with their living standards are kept 
in check by the threat of repression.
Gorbachev’s government did occasionally 
use force (the most prominent examples 
being Tbilisi in 1989, Baku in 1990, and 
Vilnyus in 1991). It is still not clear whether 
these crackdowns were directly ordered by 
Gorbachev. However, in his later years in 
power, it was becoming increasingly clear that 
Gorbachev did not want to use force against 
a major protest in Moscow—or would not be 
able to. The protests against the Communist 
Party brought hundreds of thousands to the 
streets of Moscow in 1990 and early 1991. In 
personal conversations, Gorbachev argued 
that he was always against shooting at peace-
ful protesters. But the events in August 
1991 (during the  anti-Gorbachev coup) also 
showed that soldiers would not necessarily 
shoot at protesters even if ordered to. 
Whether for the lack of willingness or for 
the lack of capacity, Gorbachev did not have 
15 Djankov et al. (2003) argue that the main challenge 
in a dictatorship is to build the commitment not to expro-
priate. Besley and Kudamatsu (2008) show how such 
commitment devices are created in successful autocracies 
(including China!) where the system manages to mimic the 
checks and balances similar to those in democracies with 
rule of law.
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an option to exert violence; therefore, he 
had to maintain living standards. Similarly, 
he could not negotiate a credible arrange-
ment with all the interest groups (generals, 
collective farm managers, industrial man-
agers). They understood that Gorbachev 
would not be able to commit to future pay-
ments. Hence, they did not want to agree 
to a required fiscal adjustment. This is why 
Gorbachev’s government embarked on a 
path to inevitable bankruptcy. Miller calls 
this approach “ Chinese-style reforms with-
out  Chinese-style budget discipline.” After 
all sources of revenues—borrowing, printing 
money, and raiding household deposits in 
the state banks—had finally been exhausted, 
Herbert Stein law took its toll.
2.2 Alternative Theories
As a political economist, I find the argu-
ment above very compelling. However, other 
economists and social scientists may think of 
Miller’s narrative as “a theory,” rather than 
“the theory,” of Soviet collapse.
First and foremost, even if one accepts 
Miller’s political economy argument, it is not 
immediately clear whether his categorization 
of interest groups is correct. Why and how 
does he arrive at the “unholy trinity” of TEK, 
OPK, and APK? Miller describes the size of 
OPK (pp. 59–60), but not of the other two—
and not of other potential lobbies. Given 
the centrality of the  TEK–OPK–APK story 
to the book’s argument, it is striking that the 
justification of the choice of the three as the 
main powerful  antireform lobbies is based 
on a single reference to page 157 in a book 
edited by Ellman and Kontorovich (1998). 
The latter is a compilation of essays of 1990s 
reform insiders. Page 157 is a part of Yevgeny 
Yassin’s essay, which describes the “‘Radical’ 
Economic Reform, 1987–1989” saying: 
The government was afraid to tread on 
the privileges of three powerful blocs: the 
 Fuel-Energy Complex, the  Military-Industrial 
Complex, and the  Agro-Industrial Complex. 
It hesitated to infringe upon the interests of 
any social force no matter how essential such 
moves were to stabilize the economy. Perhaps 
there was some feeling of goodwill: ‘We want 
to make everyone happy, so everyone should 
also make everyone else happy, and everything 
will turn out fine.’
This essay does not justify the choice 
of the three “powerful blocs.” Nor is this 
choice discussed in other essays in the book. 
Overall, even though the choice of TEK, 
OPK, and APK is reasonable, there is a 
question regarding two other potentially 
important interest groups. First, there was 
the central party apparatus that resisted 
Gorbachev reforms as it saw him threat-
ening their grip on the political system. 
Gorbachev understood it very well. Daniels 
(2007, p. 358) describes Gorbachev’s early 
June 1986 meeting with intelligentsia where 
Gorbachev openly refers to the “apparatus 
that broke Khrushchev’s neck and … will 
break the neck of the new leadership.” This 
group was adjoined by security services 
(first and foremost, the omnipotent KGB) 
that until the very end held up the ideologi-
cal beliefs in their mission and rejected any 
“revisionism” (Hollander 1999, chapter 6). 
The party and the KGB’s main interest was, 
of course, the preservation of the system; 
both understood that the reforms would 
destroy the status quo. The successfully 
resisted Khrushchev; they also played an 
active role in the 1991 coup. It is not clear 
whether a Coasian compromise could be 
achieved with the ideological core of these 
groups.
Finally, there was yet another lobby 
that played a key role in the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union. The latter—at least 
nominally—was a “federation” of fifteen 
ethnic republics (including Russia, which 
accounted for half the population and two 
thirds of the territory). Once the republics’ 
elites understood that the central govern-
ment may lack resources to fund the status 
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quo, the secessionist drive accelerated—in 
the fourteen  non-Russian republics as well as 
in Russia proper. Each republic’s elite effec-
tively represented a powerful lobby whose 
interests fundamentally differed from those 
of the Soviet government (Plokhy 2014, p. 
xxxii, 50, Daniels 2007, p. 416). This was 
aggravated by a personal conflict between 
Gorbachev and Yeltsin (whom Gorbachev 
fired from the influential position of the 
head of Moscow’s party committee in 1987). 
On the other hand, this conflict was under-
pinned by the objective divergence of inter-
ests, as it was increasingly becoming clear 
that the central government did not have 
resources to buy out subnational lobbies—
and lacked the enforcement capacity to stop 
them by force. Once again, this was not 
for the lack of trying. While Gorbachev’s 
government never used (or never dared 
to use) force in Moscow, it repressed pro-
tests (both peaceful and violent) in Tbilisi 
(1989), Novyi Uzen (1989), Fergana Valley 
(1989), Baku (1990), Dushanbe (1990), 
and Vilnyus (1991). However, by 1991 it 
became clear that further violence can only 
backfire. 
Gorbachev understood this and tried to 
negotiate a decentralization deal (the “Union 
Agreement”) in 1991. Stanislav Anissimov, 
the last Soviet Minister of Material 
Resources, provides a fascinating account 
of these negotiations (Aven and Kokh 2013, 
p. 178–184). He describes the Coasian bar-
gaining among the republics’ leaders, who 
literally sat around a table on August 9, 1991, 
and formulated their demands that the Soviet 
center could not commit to satisfy. Moreover, 
even as Gorbachev promised to stick to the 
Union Agreement, two days before signing 
the Agreement, he was arrested by the coup 
team (the “State Committee for Emergency 
Situation”). The coup then failed and subna-
tional leaders discovered that they could get 
much more power than Gorbachev would 
ever offer them with this agreement.
Let us also discuss other alternative expla-
nations that are not related to political econ-
omy. I will use Banerjee and Duflo’s (2012) 
instructive categorization of “three I’s” com-
mon barriers to reforms: ideology, ignorance, 
and inertia.
Inertia was certainly important. The 
Soviet government and Soviet public under-
stood that the system was rotten but did not 
believe that it could collapse. Their views 
were consistent with the enormous resilience 
of the system that survived huge shocks for 
seven decades (p. 147). The World War II 
victory and forty years of  postwar domina-
tion as one of two world superpowers could 
have misled the elites into believing in the 
indefinite viability of the Soviet model. This 
argument features very prominently in the 
key predecessor of Miller’s book—Collapse 
of an Empire by Yegor Gaidar (Gaidar 2007). 
Gaidar refers to multiple documents proving 
that until the very end, the Soviet ministers 
could not comprehend that the economy 
was doomed. Soviet leaders were not alone: 
international financial markets kept lending 
to the Russian government; in 1989 the inter-
est rates were similar to those of Belgium, 
Canada, Portugal (p. 147).
This had major implications for under-
standing the diverging trajectories of China 
and the Soviet Union as this difference in the 
initial conditions translated into a major dif-
ference in expectations. When Deng started 
his reforms, China was a very poor and rural 
country; Deng’s main aspiration was to avoid 
famine. Chinese households did not expect 
to catch up with the West any time soon. 
They also understood that economic growth 
was crucial to achieve whatever patriotic or 
nationalist aspirations for returning China to 
the world stage.
Gorbachev’s Soviet Union was a 
 middle-income country with very high rates 
of literacy, urbanization, and industrializa-
tion—and a superpower on par with the 
United States. This convinced its citizens that 
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the USSR could not have been too far behind 
the West.16 Interestingly, the complacency 
contributed to polarization of attitudes to 
the reforms. The interest groups themselves 
did not realize the urgency of the reforms—
as status quo seemed sustainable. On the 
other hand, radical reformers believed that 
the reforms could deliver Western living 
standards very quickly and considered  the 
dual-track approach too gradualist (p. 19). 
Such polarization was certainly not helping 
to build a coalition for Gorbachev’s reforms 
(see Frye 2010 for a general discussion of the 
negative impact of polarization on reforms in 
 post-communist countries).
Ideology was also important. Miller 
acknowledges that Soviet leadership was 
committed to ideology much more than their 
Chinese counterparts. Miller says: “To this 
day, Gorbachev believes in socialism” (p. 
20).17 Ideological constraints do limit both 
the design and the implementation of eco-
nomic reforms. On the other hand, Miller 
also shows how a skillful politician can use 
ideology to promote the reform. While Deng 
famously said “it doesn’t matter whether a cat 
is white or black, as long as it catches mice,” 
he did not dispose of the communist ideology 
openly. Deng maintained Mao’s cult to keep 
16 High expectations explain why Gorbachev is now 
so unpopular in Russia. Miller says that “Russians regu-
larly rate Gorbachev as one of their worst leaders of the 
twentieth century” and refers to a recent poll where only 
22 percent of Russians have a positive or somewhat posi-
tive opinion of Gorbachev—while 66 percent have a neg-
ative impression (p. 6). Stalin and Brezhnev enjoy much 
more support in this poll. In 1996, Gorbachev ran in the 
presidential elections and obtained only 0.5 percent of the 
vote (finishing seventh out of eleven candidates). Already 
in February 1991, Soviet citizens believed that Gorbachev 
was both “hypocritical” and “weak’’ (Dubin, Gudkov, and 
Levada 2008, p. 78).  
17 I had the very same impression from my private 
conversations with Gorbachev in 2009. It is important to 
emphasize that “socialism” here is not a Swedish or French 
model, but a 1980s’ Soviet “socialism with a human face” 
with the NEP economic model and freedom of speech and 
possibly some democratization (Daniels, 2007).
the  left-wing conservatives happy.18 At the 
same time, he did pursue the reforms that 
were perfectly inconsistent with Mao’s views. 
Another simple—but undoubtedly real-
istic and powerful—explanation is the sheer 
incompetence of Soviet elites. In economics, 
we always assume that economic agents are 
rational and fully understand the implications 
of their actions. However, the Soviet system 
has trained generations in outdated and ideo-
logical social science theories and carried out 
leadership selection based on loyalty rather 
than intellectual achievement. This certainly 
did not promote the leaders’ ability to under-
stand market economics and even the impor-
tance of macroeconomic stabilization. 
On page 153, Miller refers to Kim’s (2002) 
data on monetary emission—taking off from 
0 in 1985 to 60–70 billion rubles (about 8 
percent of GNP) in the late 1980s.19 This 
resulted in repressed inflation (as consumer 
prices were still controlled), skyrocketing 
black market prices, even higher shortages, 
inevitable  rent seeking, and disintegration 
of law and order. Bennet (1994), Boycko 
(1992), Osband (1992), and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1991) showed that monetary financ-
ing of budget deficit in a system with fixed 
prices had major adverse real effects. The 
increased shortages due to repressed infla-
tion brought up queuing and reduced labor 
supply.20 The botched efforts to address this 
issue (in particular, the infamous “monetary 
18 Another important implication of Deng’s com-
mitment to the cult of Mao was that no other politician 
(including Deng’s successors) could have built a new per-
sonality cult. This—at least until recently—has helped to 
preserve some checks and balances, regular leadership 
rotation, and certain degree of meritocracy that are cru-
cial for the efficiency of an autocratic regime (Besley and 
Kudamatsu 2008).
19 As an example of the lack of understanding of the 
basic rules of monetary economics, Miller quotes the 
speaker of the Russian parliament (a professor of econom-
ics since 1980) who believed that “more money resulting in 
more production” was an “iron law of economics” (p. 65).
20 Interestingly, Maduro’s Venezuela does not seem to 
have learned these lessons.
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reform” carried out the government in 1991) 
only reinforced the public’s suspicion of the 
government’s inability to address the prob-
lems and increased the panics (with further 
negative impact on the real economy).   
Another important dimension of incompe-
tence was the Soviet leadership’s preoccupa-
tion with industry and misunderstanding of 
the key role of services. When comparing the 
success of Japan relative to the United States, 
Soviet thinkers were certain that deindus-
trialization of the American economy was 
tantamount to its decline and did not appre-
ciate the importance of  knowledge-based 
service sectors for value added and growth. 
Not surprisingly, the share of services in 
GDP was much lower than in countries at a 
similar level of development until  the mid-
1990s (figure 3). The focus on industry of 
course provided additional clout to the three 
 antireform lobbies.
Miller does not directly reject the incom-
petence argument, but his discussion of all 
the Soviet leadership’s learning of reforms in 
the West, Eastern Europe, Japan, and China 
shows that the leadership did recognize the 
risks and was genuinely interested in reform 
models. Nonetheless, I think this debate is 
not settled yet and future historians will try to 
figure out the importance of the leadership’s 
economic incompetence during the last years 
of the Soviet Union. One forceful argument 
in support of the key role of incompetence is 
the effort by  then-Secretary of State George 
Shultz to educate Gorbachev in basic eco-
nomics. Oberdorfer (1998) describes how 
Shultz, an “economics professor turned dip-
lomat,” thought that it is worth investing a 
lot of time in delivering “informal seminars” 
in modern economics for Gorbachev. Given 
the high cost of his time, this is a revealed 
 preference proof of Shultz’s belief that 
Gorbachev lacked good economic advisors. 
There is also a possibility that the fis-
cal shock was just too large for the Soviet 
Union to survive. Miller does refer to both 
the collapse in oil prices in mid 1980s and 
Gorbachev’s  antialcohol campaign (pp. 
62–64) and argues that these two fiscal prob-
lems alone were not sufficient to bankrupt 
the Soviet Union. He refers to Sinelnikov 
and Reznikov (1995), who show that most 
of the increase in budget deficit is explained 
by growth in military spending, in public 
investment, and in reducing the taxation of 
enterprise profits (essentially, payouts to the 
industrial lobbies). The  antialcohol campaign 
increased the budget deficit by only about 1 
percent of GDP. The budget’s revenues from 
foreign economic activity declined by 2 per-
cent of GDP. 
The oil prices were, of course, not con-
trolled by the Soviet government, but the 
decision to launch the  antialcohol cam-
paign was a conscious political decision. Was 
this a miscalculation? While it was clearly 
a major contributor to the fiscal crisis and 
therefore the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the decision was not irrational. Contrary to 
the conventional wisdom, it was not an ad 
hoc move by a (teetotaler) Gorbachev who 
did not understand the economic and polit-
ical implications. Even before Gorbachev 
came to power, the Politburo was already 
planning an  antialcohol campaign, as it was 
clear that the cost of alcohol epidemics to 
health and productivity was very high and 
growing.21 There is now a consensus in the 
demographic and economics literature that 
 the antialcohol campaign did increase the 
life expectancy of Russian men; its rever-
sal in 1990s, correspondingly, resulted in a 
sharp spike in  middle-age male mortality 
and decline in life expectancy (Shkolnikov 
and Nemtsov 1997; Treisman 2010; and 
Bhattacharya, Gathman, and Miller 2013.) 
Overall, Gorbachev’s government was 
21 In our private conversations in 2009, Gorbachev did 
confirm a growing support for an  antialcohol campaign 
within the Politburo even before he came to the office; it is 
also not true that Gorbachev is a teetotaler.
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 prepared to pay the ( moderate) fiscal cost 
of this decision. This in turn shows that—at 
least initially—the government did not deem 
the fiscal challenges to be insurmountable. 
Indeed, only in 1990 and especially in 1991 
did it become clear that the budget defi-
cit had gotten out of control. Certainly, it 
was not due to the decline in oil prices or 
 antialcohol campaign, but due to continued 
 half-hearted policies of delaying reforms and 
budget cuts.  
Given the discussion above, I would con-
clude that the “three I’s” and the political 
economy of federalism are all important 
elements of the story and must be taken 
into account when we analyze the Soviet 
 experience—and its lessons for future 
reformers. But Miller’s  OPK–APK–TEK 
resistance to reforms is still an import-
ant element of the story. Gorbachev did 
understand China’s approach to reform. 
He did try to reform—even though his 
reforms were  half-hearted. He did real-
ize the importance of the vested interests 
and tried tackling them—as well as cir-
cumventing them. He, however, failed 
because he lacked state capacity and 
resources. 
Miller’s argument implies it was just too 
late to reform. How do the alternative expla-
nations above impact this verdict? Inertia 
and the power of subnational interest groups 
made Gorbachev’s job even harder. On the 
other hand, if ideology and incompetence 
played the central role, a more flexible and 
more competent reform team could have 
done a better job. I discuss these issues in 
the next section—after surveying recent 
empirical literature on the political economy 
of reforms.  
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3. History, Political Economy, Economics, 
and Alternative History
3.1 Connecting History to Political 
Economy and Economics
Reviewing a  noneconomics book always 
helps one to understand how much—or how 
little—economics can contribute to a debate 
in a neighboring discipline. The main focus of 
the book is on late-Soviet thinking on policy 
reform. Miller shows that Gorbachev’s advi-
sors did try to familiarize themselves with 
the economic developments in the West and 
in the East—and with economic research 
available at the time. It is striking how lim-
ited the economic knowledge of the institu-
tional reforms and political economy was at 
that point, and how much relevant research 
has been conducted since then. How would 
Soviet policy makers’ views change if they 
were aware of the research available today? 
This is an important discussion missing in 
the book (Miller only refers to a couple of 
the relevant economics papers). This is why I 
think it is worth surveying at least some work 
that has appeared in the last twenty-five 
years. Since this literature is huge, I will only 
refer to a few papers that have direct rele-
vance for the book’s main narrative. 
Even though Gorbachev’s reforms seem to 
have happened recently, in late 1980s econo-
mists still had not operationalized the formal 
modeling of interest group politics. The sem-
inal “Protection for Sale” paper by Grossman 
and Helpman only came out in 1994. While 
they were modeling political economy of 
trade protectionism, their theory turned out 
to be perfectly suitable for describing inter-
est group politics of any nature. 
Political economy of trade liberalization 
has also inspired the pioneering work of 
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), who explained 
why reforms that are supposed to benefit a 
majority can be rejected by a majority vote. 
This happens when the ex post allocation of 
gains from reforms is uncertain—thus the 
 antireform coalition may be large enough 
to block the reforms. This model under-
lines the importance of the clear vision of 
reform outcomes and commitment to their 
implementation. 
The importance and, in some cases, 
impossibility of commitment in politics was 
also described in Acemoglu (2003). If there 
are no strong political institutions, the Coase 
theorem may not apply. Indeed, consider a 
situation where political change increases 
the joint surplus; if there were commitment, 
the Coase theorem would imply that there 
could be a  win–win scenario where the polit-
ical challenger can pay the incumbent for 
agreeing to leave. However, in the absence 
of political checks and balances, the succes-
sor will expropriate the former incumbent ex 
post, thus undermining the latter’s ex ante 
consent to the deal. 
This “winner takes all” feature of 
 nondemocratic politics is one of the key 
lessons from  post-communist transition. 
Hellman (1998) and Frye (2010) describe 
this phenomenon to explain why countries 
with stronger democratic institutions and 
less polarized societies (Central and Eastern 
Europe) have been more successful in pro-
moting reforms. The European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (2013) 
shows that in the  post-communist region, 
there is a robust correlation between democ-
racy and economic reforms. 
Interestingly, economists studied the 
implications of “winner takes all” in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Miller shows that 
the Soviet elite were  preoccupied with the 
West and the East, but did not pay enough 
attention to the experience of Latin America, 
which turned out to be very relevant. These 
were the Latin American crises of the 1980s 
that drove the academic thinking about 
reforms at that time—especially the research 
on political economy of macroeconomic 
stabilization. Alesina and Drazen (1991) 
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 modeled the interaction between two inter-
est groups that faced the need to balance the 
budget as a war of attrition. In their theory, 
the two groups understand that delaying 
macroeconomic stabilization is costly for 
both (due to high inflation). But in order to 
cut the budget deficit, one group has to give 
up. There is no interim solution: the winner 
takes all. Hence the winner cannot commit 
to compensating the loser. The stabilization 
therefore gets delayed. (It is indeed striking 
how a paper published in 1991 perfectly pre-
dicted the delayed macroeconomic stabiliza-
tions in  post-Soviet Russia and many other 
 post-communist countries). 
The analysis of the political economy 
of Latin American reforms culminated 
in the  so-called Washington Consensus 
(Williamson 1990). Interestingly, while the 
Washington Consensus has been tradition-
ally blamed for focusing on macroeconomic 
stabilization, price liberalization, and dereg-
ulation, Williamson’s original  ten-point list 
also included the need for enforcing prop-
erty rights, broadening the tax base, funding 
social safety nets, and human capital. In this 
sense, the Washington consensus already 
recognized the importance of building insti-
tutions and taking into account the political 
economy considerations. 
However, it was exactly the experience of 
 the post-communist and Chinese transition 
that propelled institutional economics and 
political economy to the center of the analysis 
of reforms (Roland 2000, Sonin 2013). These 
events gave rise to the large literature on the 
importance of the political and economic 
institutions (and the interaction between the 
two), the success of the  dual-track reforms 
in China, and the rapid disintegration of the 
Soviet production system. One of the main 
takeaways of that literature was the impor-
tance of understanding the difference in 
political institutions in the Soviet Union and 
China. For example, Blanchard and Shleifer 
(2001) argued that the reason why federal-
ist reforms failed in Russia but succeeded 
in China was the presence of the function-
ing central party.22 By the time Gorbachev 
started his reforms, the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union had already lost legitimacy 
while in China the party was—and still is—a 
credible political institution. As argued in 
Besley and Kudamatsu (2008), this is at least 
partially explained by Deng’s ability to install 
meritocracy and regular rotation within the 
party. Since Deng, Chinese leaders have 
served only two  five-year terms each—while 
in the Soviet Union the leader’s job was sup-
posed to be for life. 
Another important part of the literature 
focused on multiplicity of equilibria. In 
these papers, the failure of the reforms is 
not  predetermined by initial conditions (or 
historical legacy), but was one of several 
potential equilibrium outcomes. For exam-
ple, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) 
showed that under the same constellation of 
parameter values, a transition economy could 
end up in a “good” equilibrium with broad 
tax base, small informal sector, and high qual-
ity of public goods and a “bad” equilibrium 
where firms prefer to move to the informal 
sector, taxes are not collected, and public 
goods are not provided. Essentially, this the-
ory—inspired by the transition experience—
preceded the influential work by Besley and 
Persson (2011) on the sources and implica-
tions of the state capacity. Johnson et al.’s 
model of endogenous state capacity implies 
that even if China and the Soviet Union 
have similar fundamentals, they may end 
up in strikingly different  politico-economic 
equilibria. And, as both equilibria are stable, 
switching between the two equilibria is very 
hard. As China begins the transition with 
strong state capacity, it is likely to preserve it. 
On the contrary, since the Soviet Union (or 
22 Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) use  cross-national 
data to show the need of strong national parties for a suc-
cessful fiscal decentralization. 
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Russia) have no state  capacity to start with, it 
is very hard to escape the “bad equilibrium.”
Similarly, there can be multiple equilibria 
in terms of the quality of market institutions. 
Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1995) argue 
that the political support for property rights 
can only come from private owners. Without 
privatization, there are no interest groups 
supporting the creation of modern market 
institutions. On the other hand, if privatiza-
tion is carried out before the market insti-
tutions are created, the assets end up in the 
hand of politically connected “oligarchs.” 
If the secondary markets functioned, this 
would only be a temporary problem, as more 
efficient owners would take over the assets 
from the original privatizers. However, if the 
market institutions are not developed, more 
productive owners have no access to finance 
to buy the assets; moreover, the technically 
competent owners may not be able to run the 
assets better than the oligarchs, as the politi-
cal connections are more important than the 
managerial efficiency. Sonin (2003) provides 
a formal model of this argument and shows 
that there may be multiple equilibria. A good 
equilibrium is characterized by protection of 
property rights and productive investment 
while a bad one is where the rich engage in 
 rent seeking—the latter pays off better than 
investment. The bad equilibrium is charac-
terized by high inequality and emergence of 
oligarchs. Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) carry 
out an empirical analysis of the emergence 
and productivity of Russian oligarchs. They 
show that in early 2000s, the concentration 
of ownership in Russian industry was very 
high and the largest owners were indeed 
the oligarchs benefiting from privatization 
of natural resource industries and political 
connections. This situation is qualitatively 
different from other countries: as shown 
in European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (2016, p. 19), nowadays only 
in  post-Soviet countries does the majority 
of billionaires’ wealth comes from natural 
resources. In all other developing regions 
of the world, natural resources account for 
10–15 percent of billionaires’ wealth; in the 
advanced economies the respective percent-
age is in the single digits. Natural resource 
rents are of course easily taxable with min-
imum distortion; the prominence of natural 
resources as a source of private wealth points 
to the capture of the state institutions by the 
rich—which results in shifting of the tax bur-
den toward other, more distortionary ways of 
funding the state budget. 
Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) do find that 
the oligarchs were more productive than 
other private owners, which is consistent 
with the “institutional economies of scale” 
argument: the bigger the business empire, 
the easier it is to influence courts, media, 
and politics and eventually obtain protection 
from competition and preferential treat-
ment. This creates the “Medici vicious cir-
cle” (Zingales 2017) where economic and 
political power reinforce each other. This 
underperformance of  non-oligarch private 
owners is also consistent with the overall 
failure of Russian privatization to improve 
productivity of privatized firms—which in of 
course undermined the political legitimacy 
of market reforms.23 
The multiple equilibria argument even 
extends to the evolution of values and pref-
erences. Aghion et al. (2010)—also inspired 
by the transition experience—develop a 
model that explains why in many countries, 
23 Brown, Earle, and Telegdy (2006) carry out a panel 
analysis of productivity of  state-owned and privatized firms 
in four transition countries and show that only in Russia has 
privatization resulted in a decline in productivity; later, in 
the early 2000s, private firms caught up with those remain-
ing in state ownership (Brown, Earle, and Gehlbach 2013). 
Guriev and Megginson (2007) survey all available empiri-
cal studies on the impact of privatization on productivity 
(including both transition and  non-transition countries) 
and show that only in Russia and in the Czech Republic has 
privatization decreased productivity of the privatized firms. 
In all other countries (including China), privatization has 
had a positive impact on productivity. 
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voters support a high degree of regulation 
even when they know that the government 
is corrupt. In this model, a “civic” behavior 
pays off in a society where businesses also 
behave in a civic way and there is no need 
for  overregulation and bribe extortion. 
Therefore, there are two stable equilibria: 
one with a high level of trust, civicness of 
business, and reasonable regulation (and 
hence no scope for bribe extortion) and the 
other one with low trust, greedy businesses, 
and support for government overregulation 
of business (and hence higher corruption). 
Finally, the comparisons of the Soviet 
Union and China in the late 1980s should 
be viewed in the light of the recent “mid-
dle-income trap” literature (see a recent 
survey in Asian Development Bank 2017). 
These papers suggest that low-income and 
middle-income countries face different 
development challenges. The poor countries 
(such as China in the late 1970s and 1980s) 
should focus on rural–urban reallocation and 
a building industry based on cheap labor and 
capital investment. At the same time, the 
middle-income countries (such as the Soviet 
Union in 1980s or China today) are too close 
to the productivity frontier to rely on adopt-
ing technologies developed by others. The 
middle-income countries should develop 
political and economic institutions that pro-
mote innovation, rather than imitation of 
new technologies. These institutions require 
competition and openness—and freedom 
of entrepreneurship. The literature argues 
that such institutions are not compatible 
with suppressing dissent. The literature also 
shows how many countries have gotten into 
the middle-income trap by delaying the shift 
from the “investment” to the “innovation” 
model. The quintessential example of suc-
cess is South Korea which—faced with the 
crisis in the late 1990s—managed to make 
this change. The Soviet Union in late 1980s 
did not. The question is whether today’s 
China will.
In democratic countries, political insti-
tutions hold politicians accountable for 
 improving citizens’ welfare. Deng’s and 
 post-Deng China have created meritocratic 
incentives within the Communist Party 
without democratic reforms. As shown in 
several empirical studies (Bo 2002; Maskin, 
Qian, and Xu 2000; Li and Zhou 2005; and 
Chen, Li, and Zhou 2005), Chinese lead-
ers had been more likely to be promoted 
if they managed to deliver faster economic 
growth in their provinces. The system has 
not rewarded other dimensions of develop-
ment (including local public goods, Persson 
and Zhuravskaya 2016). This system worked 
reasonably well in the 1980s and 1990s, 
while the  socioeconomic development 
could be proxied by a single scalar indicator 
of economic growth. At the current stage of 
development, the central government has to 
to include other aspects of  well-being such 
as inequality, environment, industrial safety, 
quality of governance, et cetera. This creates 
new challenges. It is not yet clear whether 
the current governance system will be able 
to address them or to transform itself to take 
China from  middle-income to  high-income 
levels of development. Jia, Kudamatsu, and 
Seim (2015) show that performance mat-
ters for promotion, but political connec-
tions matter as well; moreover, connections 
reinforce the  performance–promotion link, 
especially for the younger regional lead-
ers. Most importantly,  Martinez-Bravo et 
al. (2018) investigate China’s recent ini-
tiative of introducing local elections. They 
show that local elections do create local 
accountability, reduce corruption, and 
make the local leaders care about local 
public goods. It is, however, not clear at all 
whether China is ready to extend elections 
to higher levels of the government—and 
whether without further political reforms, 
Chinese governance institutions will be well 
suited for meeting the development new 
challenges.
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3.2 Alternative History 
The political economy research above has 
been carried out after Gorbachev’s and even 
Yeltsin’s reforms. This work therefore allows 
us to look back at the challenges described 
in the book with the benefit of hindsight. 
Knowing what we know today, can we answer 
the book’s main question in a different way? 
Was there another approach to reforms that 
could have succeeded? 
The arguments above imply that 
Gorbachev did face challenging initial con-
ditions. There were strong vested inter-
ests—both the three industrial lobbies 
described in the book and the local elites in 
the  non-Russian republics (as well as Yeltsin 
in the Russian Federation). Gorbachev 
lacked enforcement capacity and could 
not crush these lobbies. With collapsing oil 
prices, he also lacked cash to bail them out. 
Finally, the Soviet public had high expecta-
tions for the speed of reform and increase 
in living standards; and—unlike Deng—
Gorbachev did not want to (or could not) 
use force to keep the potential protesters at 
bay. 
A number of Gorbachev’s decisions have 
aggravated this initial set of challenges. 
Basic macroeconomic incompetence under-
mined productivity growth and fiscal stance. 
The lack of clear vision and reform plan has 
increased the uncertainty, and thus raised 
the transaction costs, of Coasian bargain-
ing with interest groups. The credibility 
of the Communist Party was understand-
ably low—and Gorbachev did not build his 
own  pro-reform party. Gorbachev also did 
not introduce direct presidential elections, 
missing a chance to gain his own legitimacy 
 versus the interest groups.  
However, even without these addi-
tional problems, the objective challenges 
by Gorbachev probably implied that the 
reforms could only proceed with major exter-
nal financial support that the West was not 
ready to provide.24 If there were a “Marshall 
plan” for the Soviet Union at that point, the 
government could have been able to bail out 
the lobbies and/or provide higher living stan-
dards in Russia and  non-Russian republics. 
The lack of funding alone cannot answer 
the book’s question. As Miller argues, cor-
rectly, Deng’s  dual-track approach did not 
require external funding. However, for the 
 dual-track approach, enforcement capacity is 
key. Without enforcement capacity,  dual-track 
reform attempts result in a substantial increase 
in  rent seeking, disorganization, and output 
decline. This is exactly what happened. 
If the Soviet Union was not reformable, 
was  post-Gorbachev Russia? There could 
have been at least three reasons to be more 
optimistic in this respect. The key difference 
is that the  non-Russian republics elites were 
no longer a concern.25 Moreover, for the 
 post-communist Russian leadership there 
was an additional opportunity to write off a 
significant portion of Soviet foreign debt (this 
was indeed done in Poland). Also, Russian 
leadership could—correctly—announce that 
household deposits have been raided by the 
Soviet government. Third, the  post-Soviet 
reformers could blame the decline in living 
standards on the previous government (the 
recession already started in 1991, the last 
year of Gorbachev’s rule). This would make 
the  post-Soviet government more legitimate 
than Gorbachev’s. At the end of the day, 
Gorbachev was the leader of the Communist 
24 Aven and Kokh (2015) discuss this issue with the 
US Secretary of State James Baker and Russian Foreign 
Minister at the time Andrei Kozyrev. Kozyrev argues that 
in 1991, both George H. W. Bush and James Baker were 
too busy with US elections (that Republicans were losing). 
Baker recognizes that the United States underestimated 
the risks of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Also, for 
domestic reasons it was hard to justify bailing out a former 
archenemy. 
25  For brevity’s sake I do not discuss the reform 
challenges in  non-Russian  post-Soviet states. In those, 
additional opportunities emerged due to a boost in gov-
ernment’s legitimacy because of nation building and lower 
expectations in terms of income growth.
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Party that had been in power for more than 
seventy years and led Soviet economy into 
bankruptcy. 
Even with these three tailwinds, the chal-
lenges were enormous. Oil prices were still 
low and external financial support was lim-
ited, so fiscal pressures did not disappear. 
Without stable revenues, it was hard to 
develop social safety nets and design a tax 
system with low tax rates and a broad tax 
base. Private property rights were already 
undermined by spontaneous de facto privat-
ization of enterprises by their management 
during the late 1980s. 
Given the opportunities and challenges, it 
is not surprising that uncertainty was high. 
The breadth of potential trajectories dis-
cussed at that point is best captured in Yergin 
and Gustafson (1993), who formulated three 
scenarios for 2010 Russia:
(i) Russia disintegrates as its frontier regions 
rebel or drift into the orbit of neighboring 
countries; (ii) Russia is invigorated by an 
economic chudo—“miracle”—that turns it 
into a thriving exemplar of the free market;  
(iii) Russia becomes a grim military dictator-
ship, bent on expansion.26
The  Yeltsin–Gaidar government that took 
over from Gorbachev immediately under-
stood that the system was bankrupt and intro-
duced the necessary reforms that had been 
delayed by the Soviet predecessors. The 
 post-Gorbachev reformers, however, also 
made certain avoidable mistakes. I will start 
with those listed in their own postmortem 
analysis (Aven and Kokh 2015). First, they 
26 In the years that followed the publication of 
Gustafson and Yergin’s book, there were periods where 
each of the three scenarios seemed to be more realistic 
than others. The “market miracle” was especially relevant 
in  the mid-2000s when Russia was growing at 7 percent 
per year, Russia’s privatized and restructured oil, steel, and 
coal sectors increased investments, Russian IT companies 
successfully competed with Western counterparts, and the 
Russian middle class enjoyed a consumption boom.  
did not manage to build a political  coalition 
that would assure consistent  economic pol-
icy. In both Gaidar governments (1991–92 
and 1993–94) the  pro-market reformers did 
not have control of monetary policy—and 
had only a partial control over fiscal policy. 
Instead of writing off debt and adopting a 
realistic budget, the first Russian govern-
ments funded their deficits via hyperinfla-
tion. In addition to destroying investment, 
inflation also wiped out bank deposits. The 
depositors therefore blamed the loss of their 
assets on the Russian, rather than Soviet, 
government.
The second mistake—which was related 
to their political weakness—was the lack of 
communication with the public. The reform-
ers did not manage to provide a clear view of 
reforms, their timeline, and their costs. The 
third issue was the inability to guarantee the 
living standards of the most vulnerable parts 
of the society.27 Even if there was an inten-
tion to provide social benefits, the deterio-
ration of the public goods and the monetary 
financing of the budget deficits dispropor-
tionately hurt the poor. 
In addition to the three mistakes admit-
ted by the reformers themselves, there were 
other decisions—also described in Aven and 
Kokh (2015)—that have probably under-
mined the success of the reforms. First, pri-
vatization was off limits to foreigners. This 
drove down the asset prices, decreased fiscal 
returns to privatization, and eventually pro-
moted the emergence of Russian oligarchs. In 
the 1990s, this was justified by the argument 
that foreign ownership was unacceptable to 
Russian public. It could, however, be the 
case that competitive privatization auctions 
open to foreigners would provide sufficient 
funds to support the living  standards of the 
27 The European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (2016) shows that the impact of the reforms 
on material, physical, and subjective  well-being was very 
high, especially for the most underprivileged households. 
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most vulnerable households—thus creating 
public support for reforms. In an ex post 
assessment of his own past reform advice, 
Kornai (2001) argues that the approach to 
privatization based on sales (especially to 
strategic owners) has clearly outperformed 
the one based on giveaways or handing 
over the assets to dispersed owners through 
voucher schemes (as in Russia or the Czech 
Republic). 
The other issue was the lack of personal 
integrity of individual reformers. Aven and 
Kokh (2015, p.81) describe the first meet-
ing of Gaidar’s cabinet, where he announced 
that the cabinet members should not ask for 
any privileges (including apartments and 
dachas) until “life of our citizens improves.” 
This was indeed a crucial foundation for the 
reform government’s credibility. Given the 
level of  socioeconomic hardship during the 
first years of reforms, the public’s confidence 
in the government would only last as long 
as it was clear that the government mem-
bers themselves were not benefiting at the 
expense of ordinary Russians. Unfortunately, 
not all members of the team followed 
Gaidar’s tenet. 
Finally, Yeltsin’s government also did not 
get sufficient financial support from the 
West. The West welcomed Russia into the 
IMF and the World Bank and immediately 
provided access to their resources. But over-
all volumes of lending and financial aid were 
very low. In 1992, IMF lending to Russia was 
about 1 billion dollars (Aven and Kokh 2015, 
p. 342). In his afterword to Aven and Kokh 
(2015), Carl Bildt (then Prime Minister of 
Sweden) considers this lack of support a 
grave mistake made by the West. He recalls 
that Yeltsin and Gaidar’s request to G7 was to 
“create a stabilization fund of $ 4–5 billion.” 
But as the United States was busy with elec-
tions, Germany was  preoccupied with reuni-
fication, and Japan was negative because of 
the Kurile Islands, even this proposal was 
not approved. 
It is hard to judge now if avoiding the mis-
takes above would be sufficient to implement 
Gustafson and Yergin’s “miracle” scenario. 
But if future reformers (and their  supporters 
abroad) want to learn from Soviet and 
Russian experience, then not repeating them 
should increase their chances of success.
4. Conclusions and Implications for 
Russia, China, and Others
The main conclusion of the book is that 
Gorbachev could not follow Deng’s path. 
While Gorbachev understood both the need 
for reforming the Soviet Union and the 
Chinese successful approach to reforms, he 
could not have overcome the resistance of the 
interest groups. He did not have the power 
to crush them; nor had he the resources and 
capacity for credible commitment for buying 
these interests out. 
What does this argument teach us in terms 
of general theory of reforms? One interpre-
tation of this historical episode is that some 
systems are just too late to reform. If a poten-
tial reformer’s predecessors are too compla-
cent, the reformer’s choices are limited by 
the lack of financial resources and lack of 
enforcement capacity.28 
If there is no cash and capacity to reform, 
if there are no institutions to guarantee 
commitment to coalition deals, do reform-
ers stand any chance? There are two poten-
tial solutions: internal and external. In the 
internal politics, the reformers can try to 
reduce transactions costs of negotiations 
with interest groups and coalition  partners 
28 A  well-known Russian joke describes the reaction of 
Soviet leaders to the sudden stop of the Soviet train going 
toward communism. Stalin would order shooting the crew, 
Khrushchev would ask to disassemble the rails behind and 
put them in front of the train, and Brezhnev would lower 
the curtains and shake the cars so the passengers would 
feel that the progress is on track. Gorbachev would order 
train to be moved from the Russian to the European track 
without changing the wheels (the Russian track gauge is 85 
mm broader than the standard European one). 
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through institutionalizing the debate, 
building political parties, coordinating the 
expectations, and freeing up the public 
discussion. This may help in making the 
groups’ interests more transparent and bet-
ter articulated, remove informational asym-
metries, and make  win–win outcomes easier 
to achieve. In some cases, transparency may 
also reduce legitimacy of  antireform lob-
bies whose power comes from questionable 
sources, thus making it easier to crush their 
resistance.  
The external component is also important. 
If the reformers lack cash to buy out interests 
and build coalitions, they may benefit from 
borrowing abroad. If it is clear that reforms 
are to result in growth and prosperity, the 
external loans will both bring about reforms’ 
success and will be repaid as reforms pro-
ceed. Certainly, it is not always obvious that 
the reforms are likely to succeed even if sup-
ported by such lending (especially if reform-
ers themselves lack competence, consistency, 
and resolve). It is also hard to estimate the 
amounts sufficient to assure the reforms’ 
irreversibility. However, it is wrong to put 
down the role of such external support. 
One obvious example of success was the 
Marshall Plan in postwar Western Europe. 
Another, more recent example was Poland’s 
transition from plan to market. Poland man-
aged to negotiate a  write-down and restruc-
turing of its debt. It has also been provided an 
EU accession roadmap—and  post-accession 
access to EU structural funds. This generos-
ity of the West has been a key determinant of 
Poland’s successful transition. 
The stunningly different experiences of 
Poland and Russia raise the question of the 
current reform battleground: Ukraine. In the 
late 1980s, Ukraine had the same level of GDP 
per capita as Poland. Now the gap in income 
levels is approximately  threefold. It is clear 
that Ukraine needs reforms. On the other 
hand, Ukraine has no cash. It also has pow-
erful oligarchic interests and weak  political 
 institutions. Will Ukraine follow the Polish or 
the Russian trajectory? So far, it looks like at 
least some lessons have been learned. First 
and foremost, the West has been sufficiently 
generous. Ukraine has managed to write off 
and restructure its sovereign debt. There has 
also been substantial support in terms of aid 
and investment. The European Union has also 
agreed to provide visa-free regime to Ukraine’s 
citizens and market access to its businesses. 
Second, the Ukrainian government under-
stood that its legitimacy depends on integrity 
and  anticorruption drive. Many top officials 
have been fired and/or investigated for cor-
ruption. On many occasions Ukrainian gov-
ernment stood up to the oligarchs. Third, and 
most importantly, even in the presence of very 
weak enforcement capacity, Ukraine’s govern-
ment has kept its commitment to the vision of 
a European Ukraine (here it certainly bene-
fited from the  nation-building push driven by 
the continuing geopolitical risks).
The book also matters for the reform out-
look in China. Despite the unprecedented 
success of the last forty years, China is fac-
ing serious challenges and—as recognized 
by its own leaders—is in urgent need of 
“structural reforms.” China has accumu-
lated major imbalances, industrial overca-
pacity, high leverage of  nonfinancial sector, 
 nonperforming loans in state-owned banks, 
inefficiencies in state-owned enterprises, 
and potentially a real estate bubble (Glaeser 
et al. 2017). Expectations of further income 
growth have increased while some funda-
mental sources of previous growth have been 
exhausted (Li et al. 2017).
With all the similarities to Gorbachev’s 
Soviet Union (at least as described by 
Miller), today’s China has a much stronger 
hand. It does have enforcement capacity and 
substantial resources that may be sufficient 
for paying out the  antireform interest groups 
or for alleviating the pain of reforms for the 
ordinary Chinese. Moreover, Chinese lead-
ership seems to be much more competent 
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than the last Soviet government that made 
some basic economic mistakes. The book, 
however, does contain an important warning 
for China. It shows that even a very powerful 
country can end up in a situation where it 
is too late to reform.  Brezhnev-style compla-
cency and delaying the reforms can put the 
future Chinese leaders in Gorbachev’s shoes. 
Chris Miller’s book describes the insur-
mountable challenges reformers would face 
in this situation. The book should therefore 
be read by anyone who wants to understand 
how to avoid repeating the past mistakes—
and the students of China should certainly 
take note.
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